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Abstract. Scientific funding within the academy is an often complicated affair involving 
disparate and competing interests. Private universities, for instance, are vastly outpacing 
public institutions in garnering large, prestigious, science-related grants and external 
research investment. Inequities also extend to the types of research funded, with 
government, corporate, and even military interests privileging certain types of inquiry. This 
article proposes an innovative type of science research fund using cryptocurrencies, a fast-
growing asset class. Although not a total funding solution, staking coins, specifically, can 
be strategically invested in to yield compound interest. These coins use masternode 
technologies to collateralize the network and speed transaction pace and may pay dividends 
to masternode holders, allowing institutions that purchase these types of central hubs to 
potentially engage in a lucrative form of dividend reinvestment. Using cryptocurrencies as 
a new funding stream may garner large amounts of capital and creation of nonprofit 
institutes to support the future of funding scientific research within educational institutions. 
	
 Introduction 1.
Cryptocurrencies are purely digital assets, backed by the complexity of cryptography and the 
distributed hashing power used to solve individual blocks on the open ledger. Due to the 
computing power required to hash transactions, cryptocurrencies cannot be forged or 
otherwise duplicated. This immutability ascribes to cryptocurrencies an important inherent 
value, since it can be used to buy goods and services without concern for the funds being 
duplicated or stolen, provided that security features are employed. Additionally, 
cryptocurrencies are increasingly becoming a store of value akin to gold as an asset class. This 
research demonstrates how cryptocurrencies’ wealth-generation potential can change the 
dynamics of institutional funding for science and, more broadly, national funding trends for 
science, partly shifting the emphasis from grants to a new form of scientific funding. 
Geared toward the ultimate goal of funding science research, this article outlines an 
innovative approach to an actively managed cryptocurrency fund that was assembled by a 
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group of academics and bankers who used U.S. dollars (USD) to purchase enough of the 
selected coins to set up the initial masternodes. The pooled cryptocurrency was strategically 
deployed to earn lucrative dividends, an active investment strategy using primarily open-
source tools, such as Unix, PuTTy, and Linux’s Ubuntu. The fund enacts its strategy based on 
research focusing on cryptocurrency valuation, combining traditional valuation models with 
predictive equations. Over a six-month period, the fund produced exponential returns over 
traditional asset classes, yielding well above 400%. 
 From a broad, less technical perspective, our strategy aligns with Reiss’s notion of 
dividend reinvestment.1 Reiss underscored that wealth generation could be achieved by 
investing in assets and reinvesting any dividends into the original strategy. This notion greatly 
informed the coin selection that later populated our portfolio. We specifically purchased coins 
that use the proof-of-stake (PoS) algorithm. Once the initial coin valuation was developed, we 
populated the portfolio only with coins that returned high-yield dividends. Using the open-
source tools mentioned above, the fund’s returns were generated by hosting network full 
nodes, thus receiving a portion of the block reward (the coins generated and paid to PoS 
holders). 
The next step would be to construct a mechanism for distribution of funding that can be 
overseen and controlled by the researchers themselves. The distribution of funds is relatively 
straightforward for the prototype fund. However, when others replicate this strategy, a number 
of decisions will need to be made. For example, once a new fund is operational, funds that are 
not reinvested can be allocated on a predetermined schedule according to, for instance, 
faculty/researcher votes on proposals. A minimum disbursement to all researchers at the 
institutions might also be considered, in order to maintain a foundation of egalitarianism. 
 
 How It Works: Diversification and Investment Model Methodology 2.
Financial diversification is a foundational concept in modern portfolio theory and a time-
tested way to mitigate against financial exposure to just one asset. This proposal does not call 
for cryptocurrency to replace all traditional ways to fund science. Rather, it points to the need 
for financial diversity, held across a number of asset classes, to increase the independence and 
local control of scientific funding. For instance, Chambers reported that university 
endowments are a $100 billion-dollar industry, yet they often employ traditional strategies 
derived from managed funds.2 In the aftermath of 2008, most endowments lost a significant 
portion of principal precisely because the strategies were derived from industry standards. 
While the focus of this article is not endowments, endowment funds may most closely 
resemble a managed cryptocurrency fund, with the exception that its strategies do not reflect 
those typical of Wall Street indexes. 
It may seem paradoxical to relate traditional finance to the funding of science, yet both 
fields can become overly reliant on relatively few streams of revenue. Even Miguel 
Cervantes’s Don Quixote cautioned against venturing too many eggs in one basket, but both 
finance and science have depended, at times, on only a few sources of income. To avoid such 
over-dependence, investors have long envisioned a different type of financial diversification 
that did not rely solely upon fiat currency for financial stability. Dating back to the early 
1970s, prior to the creation of index funds, Burton G. Malkiel highlighted the need for 
portfolio diversification.3 By the beginning of 1976, Vanguard founded the first index fund, 
albeit in fiat currency, providing the type of diversification that Malkiel articulated. However, 
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in funding science, universities are still largely beholden to government grants and private 
foundations to support research, a situation that managed cryptocurrency funds can help to 
rectify. 
 
 Cryptocurrency: A New Asset Class 3.
The white paper that launched Bitcoin, which coincidentally was released at the height of the 
largest financial crisis in five generations, constituted not only a watershed development for 
digital currency but also an opportunity to introduce a more secure type of financial 
diversification against fiat currency in a fully connected world economy. Ultimately, Bitcoin 
represented a first attempt at a digital, cryptographic, international diversified currency, which 
essentially afforded a freely traded international asset. 
Bitcoin, in effect, created a new type of asset class that could be leveraged against other 
asset classes, providing needed financial diversification. Robert Greer contended that assets 
within a class share some fundamental characteristics, yet can saliently differ from one 
another in their attributes.4 Chris Burniske and Adam White, building on Greer’s framework, 
argued that Bitcoin fulfills the requirements of an asset class.5 In particular, Burniske and 
White noted that Bitcoin is unique in that it is not affected by movements in other asset 
classes, meaning that, despite volatility within its own asset class, it reduces overall risk as 
part of a portfolio. 
Moving beyond Bitcoin’s straightforward proof-of-work (PoW) model, our fund deploys 
newer cryptocurrency algorithms that have generated richer returns. Predicated on a working 
prototype funded with staking coins, this project positions the current working model for use 
by science-focused institutions, including research-intensive universities, or, more broadly, 
any higher education institution. The innovative deployment of staking coins can become a 
way to fund scientific research that operates not only outside the traditional banking and 
investment space but also beyond the parameters of National Science Foundation (NSF) and 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. Staking cryptocurrencies, such as PIVX, Dash, 
and a number of others, are fully backed by the complexity of cryptography while 
simultaneously earning dividends. Even though staking coins are prone to volatile price 
extremes, a staking coin’s dividend features tend to offset price fluctuations. The dividend 
features of staking coins thus position them as a prudent and potentially lucrative choice for 
science funding diversification.  
Figure 1 (below) details one particular strategy that deploys staking coins to fund science. 
As demonstrated in the working prototype, the model transitions from a theoretical discussion 
of funding to both an axiological and ontological investment construct. Specifically, the model 
envisions how Dash and PIVX, requiring 1,000 coins and 10,000 coins respectively, could 
function as a way to fund research. The example sketches how central hubs, often called 
masternodes, could generate capital. Central hubs generate dividends, as seen in the shared 
pool. Once these dividends reach the threshold to acquire an additional central hub, a new 
central hub can be created, earning even more dividends. 
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Fig. 1. Model for staking coins for scientific funding. The term masternodes is 
interchangeable with central hub. 
The model in Figure 1 depicts one deployment of staking coins that provides a non-static 
compound-interest vehicle. Again, this is not a conceptual model: over the past ten months, 
this group of researchers, in conjunction with software engineers and bankers, has built and 
used this model, seeing substantial monetary gain. This model holds great promise to augment 
funding for science, though the prototype needs to be more fully tested and should serve 
primarily as a portfolio diversifier rather than a total funding solution. 
Figure 2 (below) highlights the growth of both Dash (from February 2014 to August 2017) 
and PIVX (from February 2016 to August 2017). 
 
LEDGER VOL 2 (2017) 65−76 
	
 
l e d g e r j o u r n a l.o r g 69 
 
ISSN 2379-5980 (online) 
DOI 10.5915/LEDGER.2017.108	
	
	
Fig 2. Year-to-date increases for Dash (previous page) and PIVX (above), retrieved from 
coinmarketcap.com. 
 Background 4.
The funding of scientific research in the United States currently operates as an 
intergovernmental and private equity exercise in which monies from federal organizations, 
private institutions, businesses, and high net-worth individuals provide the financial capital for 
the production of scientific knowledge. This system functions as an often-complicated affair, 
involving disparate stakeholders competing for the intellectual property that research produces 
and researchers vying to extend their respective funding streams. Giroux noted that funding 
determines the kinds of research that occurs in the first place, with corporate and even military 
interests, for instance, privileging certain types of inquiry.6, 7 Kennedy reports, for example, 
“By far, the dominant sources of funding for R&D in America have been private industry and 
the federal government” and that “government support for development far outpaces 
investment in either basic or applied research . . . due to the high proportion of the Department 
of Defense’s large R&D budget that is devoted to the development of weapons systems and 
other military technologies.”8 Mervis noted that the U.S. government’s scientific funding 
peaked during the Cold War, underwriting nearly 70 percent of all science research funding.9 
However, despite massive geopolitical changes, that number remained at over 60 percent as 
recently as 2004. Comparably, Marion Nestle noted a growing conflict between corporate 
concerns and science research in the field of nutrition, where private industry conducts 
research that might more accurately be termed marketing.10 Nestle’s contentions apply to 
many other fields of science, including pharmaceutical research. Sergio Sismondo noted the 
complexities of the advancement of scientific research faces when partnering with an industry 
that needs to produce and sell products,11 while Piccirillo, Yueh, Davies, and Weaver recently 
addressed the complexities of the intersection of patient care, science funding, and corporate 
sponsorship.12 All of these observations speak to the ways in which the lack of diversification 
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in science funding, its restriction primarily to corporate and governmental interests, erects 
obstacles to the sustained production of scientific knowledge. 
Scientific funding for research can thus, paradoxically, hinder and even preclude novel 
inquiry.13 Further, the way in which resources dedicated to scientific inquiry are garnered and 
spent spotlights a series of complicated problems that extend beyond funding mechanisms. 
Ioannidis noted the dangers of a triumphalist narrative about scientific advancement in an 
atmosphere of already limited resources and pressure for further budget cuts, in which “vocal 
and aggressive competitors” receive funding over “appropriately cautious and self-critical” 
researchers and high-risk “innovative ideas already struggle to find support.”14 To Ioannidis’s 
point, competition for scientific resources and knowledge is fierce, and, troublingly, scientific 
inquiry and funding policies are greatly influenced by policy-makers who often lack the 
experience or knowledge to properly make critical decisions. Haller and Gerrie noted that 
governmental and business interests frequently commission supposed scientific experts to 
support proposals and funding initiatives that are, incongruously, not vetted scientifically.15 In 
order to promote industry-approved perspectives, for example, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) recently announced that scientists receiving EPA grants are no longer eligible 
to serve on EPA advisory committees, and their replacements are almost certain to have strong 
industrial and local governmental ties. 
Similarly, Greenwood and Levin discussed the increasing separation of the academic 
world from the governmental procedures that dictate the very policies to which academic 
researchers must adhere.16 Additionally, the funding system skews in favor of certain 
institutions, which can stifle innovation. Despite governmental efforts, funding directed 
toward public institutions continues to decline across all areas, but also specifically for science 
research—remaining substantively lower than pre-2007 levels. Mortenson has extensively 
examined declines in state funding, detailing yearly reductions in nearly every state since 
1976, which have consequently increased the importance of competitive grant funding and 
existing endowments.17 The result is what Ali, Bhattacharyya, and Olejniczak noted as a 
pattern of social reproduction—a mechanism by which existing hierarchical social structures 
reproduce themselves, thereby maintaining the status quo.18 They argued that institutional 
resources profoundly influence the degree to which private universities are vastly outpacing 
public institutions in garnering NIH and NSF grants, along with other prestigious and often 
generous research funding. While one may argue that the distribution of such grants merely 
reflects the merit of these private institutions, measured in their ability to attract distinguished 
faculty and, via institutional endowments, to support extensive research and pass down 
intellectual capital, there is little doubt that a more egalitarian playing field in scientific 
research would yield at least a more diverse range of studies and interpretations. Further, since 
wealthier private institutions already possess an advantage when it comes to funding, their 
dominance in scientific research and its lines of inquiry becomes self-sustaining, which itself 
is potentially problematic. 
As a counter-narrative to these processes, McKinley et al. proposed “citizen science,” 
engaging the public in scientific projects, as a way to more fully examine scientific spending 
and policies.19 In proposals that are more theoretical than policy-driven, McKinley et al. 
presented citizen science as mitigating the dominance of scientific inquiry by industrial and 
other powerful external stakeholders. McKinley et al.’s conception of citizen science is a 
twofold process that includes collective domain knowledge building and political action. This 
distributed model of scientific labor and decision-making provides a useful way to think about 
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disrupting the current concentration in relatively few hands of funding and resources and to 
reduce researchers’ reliance on governmental and commercial interests. 
McKinley et al.’s model, as democratic and distributive as it is, overlooked that funding 
for basic research is at the center of most scientific developments. Chomsky illustrated, albeit 
ambivalently, how governmental support for basic research has catalyzed American 
technological advances, new industries, and wealth-generating opportunities;20 nevertheless, 
his scholarship on funding did not propose any alternative. For example, Chomsky examined 
how Silicon Valley’s startup culture revolved around government support, yet he tended to 
undervalue the innovation needed to wrangle that support into working technologies.21 Reif 
similarly recognized that funding for basic research anchors most innovations, but still 
supported the need to balance government funding for that research with its potential public 
and commercial benefits.22 
One means to resist these trends is to use a cryptocurrency fund to independently generate 
capital for research. More specifically, institutions adopting PoS cryptocurrency funds could 
implement a transparent, democratic in-house mechanism to allocate generated dividends to 
researchers, while holding, likely for an extended time period, the original masternodes and 
generating more dividends. This cryptocurrency portfolio may increase funding and 
endowment opportunities, open avenues of research not typically favored by governmental 
and commercial backers, and render feasible more progressive and arguably more effective 
models of cooperative research. 
 
 Re-Envisioning the Funding of Scientific Research 5.
The established process for funding scientific inquiry and its later deployment into enterprise 
has been remained relatively unchallenged. Ioannidis, Reif, and Chomsky made 
recommendations within the confines of existing policy rather than presenting alternatives to 
this process.14, 22, 20, 21 Chomsky astutely framed that governmental funding propels science, 
yet he did not or could not propose anything other than more government funding.11 Giroux, 
rooting his work in Chomsky’s framings, evaluated the thorniness of the American education 
system, and particularly scientific inquiry, which is so closely tied to military interests;6, 7 yet, 
like all of the writers mentioned here, he failed to reimagine the current funding frameworks. 
A body of literature exists, including McKinley et al. and, to a lesser degree, the work of 
science educators Roth and Barton, that does propose an alternative.19, 23 However, such work 
may underestimate the political power of higher education institutions, government, and 
commercial forces to continue to appropriate the power of science. Shore described such 
appropriation as “neoliberal,” in that it attempts to privatize public goods—in this instance, 
scientific research.24 With neoliberal ideology and practices firmly entrenched, there often 
appears to be little incentive, particularly for the well-funded scientific researcher, to 
challenge the current system. Lehner and Finley contended that university researchers could 
easily follow a careerist path, publishing in high-ranking academic journals and collecting 
funding from traditional sources25; yet these strategies are void of more substantial 
contributions to science and often undermine the student-focused mission of higher education. 
The result often is that current funding systems remain underexamined or that critics such as 
Shore and Strathern offer few practical ways to redress fundamental, systemic problems.24, 26 
In contrast, the proposed approach offers concrete steps to create one potential alternative 
path for funding scientific inquiry. Moving away from merely theorizing the dynamics of 
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power within scientific funding, this work proposes that its financial tool can help to fund 
science without any intermediaries—in other words, without the obligations entailed by 
accepting National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, or other types of 
external funding. The model for this financial tool was informed by Lincoln and Guba’s, 
Tobin’s and Lehner’s notion of catalytic authenticity, which notes the degree to which action 
was taken to create benefits for the research participants. 27, 28, 29, 30 
This proposed approach also was substantially influenced by Christensen’s conception of 
technological disruption, as well as the research methodology of bricolage.31 In recent years, 
bricolage has been used as a methodology by social scientists such as Denzin and Lincoln and 
Kincheloe, McLaren, Steinberg, and Monzó.32,.33 Fundamentally, bricolage is about 
reassembling what is at hand into new configurations, and moving bricolage from method of 
inquiry into a force for scientific educational funding aligns more fully with Levi-Strauss’s 
framing of the concept.34 By fusing catalytic authenticity with the notion of technological 
distribution, we refine Levi-Strauss’s understanding of bricolage and purposefully deploy it as 
a tool for catalytic authenticity. In this proposed approach, a fresh configuration involves 
creating a technological disruption by combining existing cryptocurrencies and investment 
strategies to generate a new, alternative path to fund scientific research. 
 
 Staking Coins as a Funding Source for Scientific Research 6.
Universities are far from the only sites of scientific research that could benefit from a 
cryptocurrency fund. It is possible, even desirable, that simply garnering large amounts of 
capital to create nonprofits or institutes could comprise the future of funding scientific 
research. This approach may be best exemplified by the $250 million donation by Sean Parker 
for the creation of the Parker Institute for Cancer Immunotherapy (PICI). There is little doubt 
that consortia akin to PICI represent a forward-facing vision of science, a future that 
faculty/researcher-controlled cryptocurrency endowments could help to bring about. PICI 
does not necessarily need specific goals for continual funding (contrary to most government 
grants, which are entirely dependent on hundreds of predetermined criteria); the overarching 
ethos of the institute is that the best scientific work occurs during exploratory phases that 
traditional research grants simply are not engineered to support. In some cases, rigorous 
spending regulations even result in funds being wasted in order to remain in compliance. 
Additionally, Parker’s initiative is unique in that rival universities’ researchers collaborate and 
can access other researchers’ aggregated data through a PICI portal.26 If this approach became 
more standard, scientific research might progress much more quickly and perhaps with more 
accuracy. The undergirding principles informing PICI, increased flexibility in spending and 
discretion over funds, may be replicable via a cryptocurrency fund. 
The hundreds of successful initial coin offerings (ICOs) on the Ethereum network serve as 
a case in point for alternative funding. Ethereum, in addition to other new fundraising 
platforms (NEO, EOS, LISK, etc.), provides a view into new forms of fundraising. In 
particular, at the time of writing, NEO has surged into the seventh spot for all 
cryptocurrencies. NEO’s recent dramatic increase in value is somewhat paradoxical, in that 
NEO is not fully a cryptocurrency as such. NEO, like the other coins mentioned, functions 
almost exclusively as a fundraising platform for other crypto projects. 
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 Limitations and Development Hurdles 7.
Although staking coins are potentially lucrative, further research is required to more fully 
explore their viability as a long-term strategy. Admittedly, science funders must consider a 
variety of sometimes obscure and heterodox factors when selecting an altcoin that may yield 
sufficient gains. For example, NEO’s ties to China could affect changes in its value. Indeed, 
the cryptocurrency market has seen a sharp increase in Chinese versions of existing open-
source coin projects. The launch of Genaro, the Chinese version of Filecoin, is but one 
example, and many see NEO as the Chinese version of Ethereum. Another factor to consider 
is how outside actions have affected coin value growth. For example, Poloniex, one exchange 
where altcoins are traded, delisted 17 coins in May 2017. This action may have led to a sharp 
increase in a large percentage of altcoins’ valuations. Such considerations present 
complications, however, rather than insurmountable obstacles. 
Additionally, we are keenly aware of the paradox in calling for independent funding based 
on a prototype developed jointly with bankers. Nonetheless, the purpose of this proposed 
approach is more important than the allies who have helped to create the prototype. Further, 
the strategy of staking coins, moving away from the relatively static PoW concept, has 
potential for scientists and has generated substantial new capital. That said, PoS coins, 
specifically, can be seen as unfair to newcomers because they have the propensity to favor 
those with preexisting market advantages and are based on a network effect. However, the 
utilization of this network effect for the public good counterbalances concerns about PoS 
coins within the fund, as the social intelligence and reputation often required to participate are 
already achieved within the prototype itself; surely, leveraging a coin’s potentially 
exclusionary characteristic for the greater good cannot be construed as harmful. As for raising 
capital via an ICO, we acknowledge the risk of an undervaluation without sufficient publicity 
but are confident that the product speaks for itself and will allow for the fund eventually to be 
valued by its worth alone (notwithstanding that the fund generates capital wholly 
independently of its coin value). 
In addition to more research and prototyping, new development tools such as better coin 
control tools and monitoring mechanisms are required and/or need to be made publicly 
available on Github or another developer forum. The authors are aware of the potential for 
fraud but are optimistic that the type of research and reconnaissance done by the team in 
developing the prototype can guard against it. There are, of course, those who wonder about 
incoming regulations from the Securities and Exchange Commission and international 
governance bodies with regard to the efficacy of ICOs. The authors have consulted with and 
had the prototype approved by a battery of lawyers, regulators, and licensors. 
 
 Conclusion 8.
Many intricacies encumber the process of funding scientific research within the United States. 
Federal organizations, private institutions, businesses, and individual donors each contribute 
monies in a variety of ways, making for a confusing system at best and a purposefully 
shrouded one at worst. Multiple interests are at play when it comes to backing scientific 
research of all kinds. Historically, there has not been an institutionalized opportunity to bypass 
this system, but the use of cryptocurrency for scientific funding can now challenge its 
supremacy. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies offer a reprieve from the staunchly 
traditional endowment and grant models that depend on structures (often as limiting 
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methodologically as they are insufficient financially) that have plagued scientific funding 
since the late nineteenth century and continue to do so well into the twenty-first. We argue 
that using open-source staking algorithms may be one alternative to the relatively static 
streams of governmental and private funding for scientific research. In particular, this 
proposed innovative model spotlights how a shift toward cryptocurrency for scientific funding 
may generate capital for scientific research and, in higher education settings, student 
development via dividend reinvestment. This dividend reinvestment approach not only may be 
both more egalitarian and accessible, but also may drive innovation by granting researchers an 
independence and ability to collaborate rather than compete that will benefit them, their 
colleagues, and the public good. 
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